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I. INTRODUCTION
"The life of a people is conceived as a scheme of coop-
eration spread out in historical time."
"We do not inherit the earth from our parents, we borrow
it from our children."
2
Two hundred and fifty years ago, the eastern portion of
the United States was covered by a complex ecosystem
consisting of deciduous forest with a diverse array of wild-
life. European invaders drastically altered this environ-
1. JOHN RAWiS, A THEORY OF JUSICE 289 (1971).
2. This saying is of questionable provenance. Although described as a Native
American saying, it has been tracked to speeches by, among others, President
George Bush. See Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gft Property and the Quest for
Environmental Ethics, 24 Envtrl L. 1. 25, fn. 84 (1994).
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ment through exploitation of the natural resources of North
America. Today, pockets of this early forest system survive,
but most of the continent is now covered by a simpler eco-
system consisting largely of McDonalds and Starbucks
Coffee shops. Our world is different because of the actions
of earlier generations. How is one to judge the "morality" of
the conduct of these earlier generations? Have they vio-
lated moral "rights" that I, a current member of their future,
hold? Have they failed in some "duty" or "obligation" to
me?
Few issues of environmental ethics are of greater signifi-
cance than an assessment of this "moral relationship" be-
tween the present and future.3  Our consumption of re-
sources will limit the availability of those resources in the
future. Present degradation of environmental quality will
have health and aesthetic impacts on future generations.
Our actions inevitably will both limit and expand options
available to the future through the creation and distribu-
tion of wealth and the alteration of the environment.
In some sense, however, an ethical evaluation of actions
that affect the future is no different than an evaluation of
actions affecting existing humans. A polluting industry can
inflict harm on neighbors while providing economic and
other gains to workers and society as a whole. The location
of a hazardous waste facility can raise questions of envi-
ronmental justice and distributional fairness if segments of
the existing population are unfairly singled out to bear a
disproportionate burden. Destruction of habitat by some
can impinge on the aesthetic and moral values of others.
This essay has three purposes. The first purpose is to
identify those distinctive qualities that distinguish a moral
analysis of our relationship to future generations from the
moral analysis that will apply to an assessment of our ac-
tions on our own generation.4 This essay suggests that the
issue of our moral relationship to future generations has a
distinct component only for those actions that have irre-
versible consequences that will be experienced more than
two generations in the future. Actions with shorter term
3. This essay uses the term "moral relationship," perhaps to excess, to avoid
characterizing the relationship in terms of obligation or duty.
4. See Infra notes 8-43 and accompanying text.
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consequences may be properly seen as raising the same
concerns that apply to disputes among existing humans.
The second purpose is to evaluate our moral relationship
to future generations in terms that are familiar in Western
ethical thought.5 For many, this moral relationship should
be analyzed in terms of "rights" and "obligations" -- moral
claims that the future somehow makes on us. As dis-
cussed below, however, there are substantial conceptual
and technical problems in evaluating our moral relation-
ship to the future in rights-based terms. Furthermore, the
outcome of a rights-based approach can be a set of pro-
posed rights and obligations that are not meaningful guides
for present decisions.
The third, and most important purpose of this essay, is to
suggest that our moral relationship to future generations
may best be viewed, not in terms of rights and obligations,
but through reliance on "virtue ethics."6 Our concern for
the future can be seen as an expression of the principle of
benevolence and a recognition of the dignity and worth of
all life. Through virtue theory, the morality of our actions
are to be evaluated, not from the perspective of demands or
claims that the future might be said to make on us, but
rather from the recognition that our concern for the future
is an expression of our best virtue.
This shift in perspective has direct consequences. A fo-
cus on present virtue leads to the recognition that we must
evaluate the morality of our actions in terms of our own vi-
sion of the well-being and the quality of life that we wish to
see experienced in the future. It anchors the analysis of
actions in the moral framework that we hold today without
presuming to predict the moral and non-moral preferences
of an infinite stream of future generations.!
5. See Infra notes 44-84 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
7. It Is important to stress that a focus on our moral relationship to the future
should not minimize other relevant moral concerns that might also affect our
evaluation of the propriety of an action. Concerns about the impact of an action
on existing humans, on non-human species or on nature as a whole may drive
our view of the morality of an action independent of any concern about the impact
on future generations.
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II. IDENTIFYING THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF OUR MORAL
RELATIONSHIP TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
All human actions that affect the physical environment
may raise moral concerns. Our actions can affect the
rights and well-being of non-human animals, of other pres-
ent humans, and of humans in future generations. Identi-
fying the distinctive issues associated with our moral rela-
tionship to future generations raises at least three
questions. When does the "future" start for purposes of our
moral analysis? What is the basis for acknowledging a
moral concern for future generations? Are there relevant
factual differ44nces that distinguish the analysis of our
moral relationship to future generations? The answers to
these questions will affect the way in which any ethical
analysis is applied to the issue of our relationship to future
generations.
A. When Does the Future Start?
If we are to distinguish those ethical issues that are par-
ticularly associated with our relationship to future genera-
tions, we need to identify the point at which the differences
between the present and future generations warrant dis-
tinct analysis. In other words, we need to determine when
the future starts. This issue of time scale is sometimes
overlooked in general discussions of the rights of future
generations.
Several factors suggest that there is a sharp distinction in
our moral relationship to people who will exist within the
next few generations and those that will exist in the more
distant future.8 First, we can and do have a direct emo-
tional connection to our children and grandchildren, and
even to our great-grandchildren. Whether we personally
8. There is another basis for distinguishing those actions that have special rele-
vance to our moral relationship to the future. Those actions whose consequences
are reversible within some reasonably short period of time may not raise distinct
moral issues of future responsibility. Consider, for example, a present decision to
build on coastal property. If those structures can be removed and the ecology and
aesthetics of the coast restored within a reasonably short period of time, then fu-
ture humans will have the same capacity to express their values and preferences
as current humans. Their "future" status may not distinguish their moral claims
from those of existing humans who may dispute alteration of the beach environ-
ment.
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know them or not, our imagination is capable of including
them within our immediate moral community. Beyond a
few generations, the ties become more tenuous.9 Moreover,
we are also capable of imagining the preferences and values
of people who will exist within the immediate future. Of
course we may be wrong in our projection, but the world
inhabited by people of the more immediate future can still
be seen as an extension of our own culture. Third, al-
though all predictions of the future are uncertain, the like-
lihood that we can accurately predict events that will occur
several generations in the future is small. Fourth, as dis-
cussed below, overwhelming technical problems arise in a
utilitarian assessment of our moral relationship to genera-
tions in the far distant future.' ° In contrast, issues such as
the valuation of future preferences and the discounting of
future costs to present value are difficult, but manageable,
when applied to impacts in the near future. These con-
ceptual and analytical factors suggest that the distinctive
issue of our moral relationship to future generations only
applies to actions that will have consequences on humans
more than two or three generations, perhaps eighty to one
hundred or so years, into the future."
Although this conclusion is not compelled, these factors
also suggest that there are no distinct "future generation"
ethical issues where the consequences of an action will be
experienced solely by persons within the next one hundred
years. This is not to minimize the ethical concerns that
arise with respect to actions whose consequences are felt in
the near future; it is only to suggest that it may not be pro-
ductive to think of them in terms of some distinct moral
relationship to the future.
Consider, for example, the issue of the proper level of re-
mediation of property contaminated by a pollutant that will
9. One commentator has posited a greater responsibility towards more immedi-
ate descendants since "the nearer the generations are to us, the more likely it is
that our conception of the good life is relevant to them." M.P. Golding, Obligations
to Future Generations in REsPONSIBILrTIEs TO FUnURE GENERATIONS 170 (E. Par-
tridge, ed. 1981).
10. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of problems
in comparing present and future costs and benefits.
11. Does this suggest a new "Rule in Favor of Perpetuities" where our distinctive
moral concern for the future begins with, rather than excludes, those who will ex-
ist in approximately "a life in being plus 21 years?"
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naturally degrade within the next one hundred years.
Moral issues, such as the appropriate balance between the
costs of remediation and the imposition of increased risks
to human health, involve the same moral concerns regard-
less of whether we are dealing with threats to present hu-
mans or to grandchildren not yet born. These grandchil-
dren, of course, are not now able to participate in the
debate, but current humans who have an immediate emo-
tional tie to their grandchildren's well-being and who un-
derstand the preferences of those grandchildren now can,
and do, speak on their behalf. Furthermore, although all
predictions are uncertain, the uncertainty of our estimate
of the effects on present humans is likely to be the same as
the uncertainty of our estimate on the effects on humans in
the immediate future. In contrast, predictions of impacts
in the more distant future involve greater and distinctive
levels of uncertainty associated with the greater likelihood
of unanticipated intervening events.
2
B. What is the Basis of Our Moral Relationship to the
Future?
Why should we care about the future? A perfectly tenable
case could be made that we have no obligation of any kind
to consider the impact of our actions on future generations
- in other words, "the future be damned."'3 If, however, we
recognize a moral relationship with the future, we must
consider why we include future humans among the class of
entities to whom we extend moral consideration. The an-
swer can potentially affect the scope and demands of this
relationship.
There is considerable debate over the basis for any moral
responsibility we have to the future. 4 One possible ap-
12. See 0nfra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dis-
tinctive aspect of uncertainty that arises from the possibility of unanticipated in-
tervening events.
13. See Robert L. Hefilbroner, What Has Posterity Ever Done for Me?, in
RESPONSIBIIIES TO FUTURE GENERAIIONS, supra note 9 at 191. Mr. Hefilbroner
notes that "[no argument based on reason will lead me to' care for posterity or to
lift a finger in its behalf. Indeed, by every rational consideration, precisely the op-
posite answer is thrust upon us with irresistible force." He then goes on to find
the basis for concern outside the limits of "rational argument."
14. See generally RESPONSIBUITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra note 9;
OBuGATIONS To FUTURE GENERATIONS (R.I. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds. 1978);
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proach is to determine whether future humans have moral
"rights." The issue of rights can be significant since identi-
fication of rights may imply that others have a duty not to
infringe upon those rights. In other words, rights-based
arguments lead to the language of duty and obligation. In
Dworkin's memorable description, rights are "trump."'5
The literature reflects a variety of arguments as to
whether future humans can be said to have "rights." For
some, identification of a group as a "moral agent" may be a
basis for identification of that group as a "rights" holder.'"
To identify a group as "moral agents" involves, in part, an
analysis of whether that group has the capacity to under-
stand and exercise autonomous choice relating to moral
decisions." In this view, current humans are moral agents
who have both moral status as rights holders and obliga-
tions to exercise their moral reasoning." For some, non-
human animals are not moral agents and thus cannot be
viewed as having moral rights themselves.'9 The debate,
with respect to future humans, focuses on whether our
non-existent (or not yet existent) descendants can be said
to have the insight and understanding necessary to classify
them now as moral agents.
Others have argued that moral rights stem from the rec-
ognition of some inherent interests, needs or preferences of
an entity.2 ° Since a rock has no inherent interests, some
CHRISTOPHER STONE, EARTH AND OTHER Enucs (1987).
15. RONALD DwORmN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977). Dworkin writes:
Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have
rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for
denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient
Justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them.
Id.
16. See STONE, supra note 14 at 73-83 (discussion of the arguments relating to
the "moral considerateness" of entities).
17. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Antmals and Unborn Generations, in
RESPONSIBIImES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra note 9 at 141 (discussing argu-
ments relating to the moral status of future generations): W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT
AND THE GOOD (1930).
18. Christopher Stone describes a traditional moral focus on "persons." He de-
fines this class of "persons" as "limited to normal adult human beings who, pos-
sessing full human faculties and living as neighbors in time and space, are capa-
ble of knitting the bonds of a common community." STONE, supra note 14 at 20.
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would exclude rocks from the class of entities holding
moral rights.2' Present humans and non-human organisms
hold rights because it is possible to identify their inherent
interests, such as their needs to eat and breathe and pro-
create.
For others, the moral rights of the future come from some
implicit contract among an intergenerational moral com-
munity.22  In this view, there is some grand inter-
generational pact under which we, the present generation,
have been the beneficiaries of the actions of past genera-
tions and have concomitant duties to future generations.
There may also be a biblical basis for this contractual duty.
The covenants made by God of the Old Testament with
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Noah also apparently run to
"heirs and assigns," thus creating an implicit relationship
among generations. This has led to suggestions that there
is a theological basis for humanity's moral obligation to
consider the needs of future generations.'
Questions of future generations as "rights" holders inevi-
tably involves concerns about the "contingent" nature of
future generations. We do not know what humans, if any,
will be born.2  For some this suggests a lack of moral
21. Id. at 140.
22. See, e.g., M.P. Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, in
RESPONSIBILxTIES TO FLTURE GENERATIONS, supra note 9 at 64; A. Baler, The Rights
of Past and Future Persons, in RESPONSIBILTIIES TO FTURE GENERATIONS, supra note
9 at 171: P. Barresi, Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An Intragenerational
Alternative to Intergenerational Equity in the International Environmental Arena, 11
Tul. Envt'l. L.J. 59, 77-79 (1997).
23. See, e.g., T.S. Derr, The Obligation to Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILrIIES
TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra note 9 at 41; Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to
Future Generations 19 (1988).
24. One scholar has actually suggested, in an argument reminiscent of tradi-
tional science fiction time travel paradox literature, that we cannot properly take
actions to promote the well-being of future generations since the very actions we
might take will alter the identity of the persons who are later born to receive such
benefits. See Anthony DAmato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Pre-
serve the Global Environment 84 Am. J. Int'l L. 190 (1990)(restating argument
first put forth by Derek Parfit in PARFrr, ON DOING THE BEsT FOR OUR CHILDREN, IN
ETHICS AND POPULATION 100 (M. Bayles ed. 1976)). In other words, by acting to
protect the future, we alter the future and, thus, interfere with the rights of those
people who would have been, but will not now, be born as a result of our actions.
Perhaps we should think of this as the "Malthusian Uncertainty Principle."
DEREK PARFTr, IN REASONS AND PERSONS (1984), makes a number of other fascinat-
ing and subtle points about the ethical issues that arise from the fact that present
actions alter the identity of future humans. This is an issue that he refers to gen-
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standing for future generations since they have no identity.
Since many would conclude that we have no moral obliga-
tion to procreate to ensure the existence of future genera-
tions, it is also possible to conclude that we have no moral
duty to contingent humans who may, or may not, come
into existence. In this view, future humans become the
holders of moral rights only when they in fact come into
existence. For others the "contingency" of future existence
does not limit the rights of future generations since we
know with certainty that some future humans will exist.
We can no more deny the rights of unknown future hu-
mans than we can deny the rights of existing humans we
may affect, even though we do not know their identity.
Although recognition of future humans as rights holders
can be a basis for requiring moral concern for the future,
such concern can be justified without resolving the rights
issue. Entities can be "moral subjects" and entitled to be
included within a moral assessment of our actions without
being rights holders. It is probably safe to say that every
article or book rejecting rights status for non-human ani-
mals begins with a statement that the author would never
kick his or her dog.'
Ultimately, the rationalization for our moral concern for
the future may simply be empirical. For whatever reasons,
we present humans do care about the future. Certainly we
care about the immediate future that our children and
grandchildren will inhabit, but, more curiously but no less
certainly, we also care about the more distant future. The
erally as the "non-identity problem." Id. at 351-379.- Parfit's arguments create an
image of an infinite number of alternative future generations spinning out of each
instant in time as our present decisions create alternative futures. Parfit's argu-
ments are similar to multi-universe interpretations arising from the probabilistic
nature of quantum physics. It is difficult, at least for this writer, to make much of
the moral consequences that arise from such a view. Since every action (or inac-
tion) alters the identity of an infinite number of ephemeral and contingent hu-
mans, it seems fair to treat their competing infinite interests as "canceling out."
In other words, we can "renormalize" the equations to cancel infinite values just
as physicists have done in quantum equations. Thus, we may be able to focus
our moral concern on the uncertain, but at least singular, class of future humans
that will exist as a result of our actions.
25. See, e.g., PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS ISSuE xii (1992). As Feinberg
notes, "Almost all modern writers agree that we ought to be kind to animals, but
that is quite another thing from holding that animals can claim kind treatment
from us as their due." Feinberg, supra note 17 at 140.
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source of such concern may be rooted in biology or some
belief in the universality of human value, both present andfuture, 26 but the existence of such a generalized human
concern in the future is universally recognized.7
This leads to a conclusion that we should consider the
future in our moral calculus because there is consensus
that we should. Of course, no such conclusion is logically
warranted. The fact that we may have some universally
recognized concern for the future does not convert that
concern into a moral imperative. Evolution may have de-
veloped a genetic predisposition to ensure the survival
through time of our genetic endowment, but that does not
mean that this fact of nature becomes a fact of morality.
This conflation of "what is" with what should be" (between
"is" and "ought") has been described as the "naturalistic
fallacy."2 On the other hand, widely accepted consensus of
the morality of a position may reflect a preexisting morality
that individuals, through their capacity for moral "intui-
tion," have expressed.29  Although translating a general
concern for future generations into a moral obligation may
pass the risk and go straight to the certainty of tautology,
so be it. For whatever reason, we humans accept (within
undefined limits) this moral concern.
C. Are There Relevant Factual Differences that Distinguish
the Analysis of Our Moral Relationship to Future
Generations?
1. The Moral and Non-Moral Preferences of Future
Generations
An understanding of human moral and non-moral prefer-
ences (what an individual believes and wants) is critical to
26. Some have suggested that evolutionary pressures that lead to behaviors
that promote concern for the survival of offspring may be the basis for this widely
held recognition of the appropriateness of concern for the future. See, e.g. Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 Tex. L.Rev. 1465, 1472 (1989);
Barresi. supra note 22 at 69-73.
27. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 23 at 17-21 (discussing historical and
multicultural examples of concern for future generations).
28. See, e.g., William K. Frankena, The Naturalstic Fallacy, in THEORIES OF
ETHIcs (P. Foot ed. 1967).
29. See, e.g.. W AM K. FRANKENa, ETHIcs 102-105 (2d ed. 1973).
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evaluating the moral consequences of our actions. Al-
though the satisfaction of preferences may not in itself be
the exclusive moral goal, an understanding of preferences
is important whether we engage in an assessment of our
actions in utilitarian terms, in terms of distributive fair-
ness, or in terms of interference with the autonomy of indi-
viduals.
There are imperfect mechanisms by which present hu-
mans can express their preferences for both moral and
non-moral values. In political contexts, preferences can be
expressed through means such as voting (or revolting). In
economic contexts, preferences can be measured through
market prices or, for non-market goods, through methods
of contingent valuation such as questionnaires.30 No such
mechanisms exist for expressing the values and desires
that will be held by persons sometime in the future. Quite
simply, we do not know what the future wants.
Indeed, even to raise the question of what the future pre-
fers reflects an error. When we consider our moral rela-
tionship to future generations, it is tempting to think of
"the future" as a discrete group of humans whose views
could be known if we could only find their phone numbers.
Obviously, however, the future would not speak with one
voice. Our actions may have consequences on humans
who will live one hundred, five hundred, or a thousand
years hence, and there is no single set of preferences held
by "the future."
Identification of the moral and non-moral preferences of
temporally distant civilizations is not a trivial concern. In
past centuries, social views about humanity's relationships
to nature and to one another -have varied widely. Native
American reverence and integration with nature and the
rather less reverential European views during the industrial
revolution both existed.3' Medieval Japan (at least as con-
ceived by James Clavell) may have held a far different view
of the relationship of the individual to the community than
30. See Infra notes 49-50.
31. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, An Exploratory Essay on Native Americans and
Environmentalism, 63 U. CoLO. L REv. 901 (1992); J. Baird Callicott, Traditional
American Indian and Traditional Western European Attitudes Towards Nature: An
Overview. IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHnosoPHY 231 (Robert Elliot and Arran Gare, eds.,
1983).
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that held by many people today. Humans living in the late
Pleistocene have been implicated in the mass extinction of
North American mammals. We cannot, without hubris
about our own current moral superiority, state what values
will be held at various times in the future.
32
Still, it has been claimed that we can identify core or uni-
versal preferences that will undoubtedly be held by all hu-
mans for all time in the future.33 Chief among any such
universal human preferences must be life. Perhaps we can
agree that all societies will recognize the value in preserving
the capacity of the earth to support human life. In other
words, there is a universal interest in not annihilating all
future humanity. Recognition of an interest in preserving
humanity as a whole, however, is of little practical value in
32. Note that this observation is limited to the descriptive question of whether
we can know the moral and non-moral preferences or values that will be held in
the future. It is quite a different matter to make normative statements regarding
the relative worth of moral values held by different cultures.
33. Kavka, for example, discounting the argument that the preferences of the
future are unknowable, has written:
Does this relative ignorance of what future people will want, and how to get it
for them, justify us in paying less attention to their interests in decision
making? I am doubtful that it does to any substantial degree. For we do know
with a high degree of certainty the basic biological and economic needs of future
generations - enough food to eat, air to breathe, space to move in, and fuel to
run machines. The satisfaction of these need will surely be a prerequisite to
satisfaction of most of the other desires and interests of future people, whatever
they may be.
G. Kavka, The Futurity Problem, in RESPONSIBILmES TO FUrTURE GENERATIONS. supra
note 9 at 11. See also J. Spear, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our Re-
sponsibilities to Future Generations, 2 N.Y.U. EnvtVl. L.J. 117, 129-130
(1993)("[Clertain fundamental interests exist such that no passage of time could
conceivably be said to lessen their importance for sustaining the basic qualities of
human life. These fundamental interests at a minimum would comprise interests
in food, shelter, health, and, in the environmental context, interests in clean air,
water and land.")
Ackerman also acknowledges the difficulties of understanding the values and
preferences of remote generations. He would rely on his concept of a "liberal edu-
cation" to create citizens who will attempt, even if imperfectly, to project or predict
the preferences of the future. The citizen's goal is to "try to sort out his own pref-
erences from those that, on the basis of his liberal education, he recognizes as
within the probable range of moral evolution.* BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 216 (1980).
Callahan, discussing whether we can know the interests of future generations,
concludes that "since we cannot know what their social ideal will be, we should
act on the assumption that it will not be all that dissimilar from our own; we have
no special reason to think otherwise." D. Callahan, What Obligations Do We Have
to Future Generations?, in RESPONSIBIIrIIES TO FUTIURE GENERATIONS, supra note 9
at 80 (emphasis in original).
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addressing most environmental issues.34
It could also perhaps be taken as axiomatic that indi-
viduals would prefer not to be killed, but even this basic
premise is not beyond dispute. People can and do give up
their lives, and therefore express a preference that the end
served by their deaths is more valuable than their lives.
Different societies have, over time, placed different values
on the sanctity or worth of life and the relationship of the
individual to society as a whole.
A universal and timeless belief in the value of life be-
comes even more problematic when the issue involves not
the certainty, but the risk, of death or injury. The willing-
ness, as a matter of personal choice or preference, to incur
health risks certainly seems to be variable.' Among other
things it seems to involve issues of wealth, social values
and perhaps personal temperament. For whatever reasons,
different people are willing to incur different levels of risk
for varying amounts of gain. Different social conditions will
presumably result in different social views on the appropri-
ate trade-off of risk for benefits.
Beyond life and health, it is difficult to conceive of a uni-
versal set of preferences. Stating that people have a prefer-
ence for clean air and water may simply be another way of
expressing the general preference for life and health, but it
34. At that level of generality, however, our obligations to the future become
largely meaningless. Some issues, such as the threat of nuclear war, in fact raise
the concern for the total annihilation of humanity. Most ethical problems raise
difficult questions, however, about the effect of our actions on the quality of future
life and the trade-off between environmental and other values. Consequently,
meaningful moral discourse about our moral relationship to the future inevitably
involves issues of the preferences and values of future generations.
More interesting questions arise regarding our right to undertake actions that
have the potential, however remote, of producing global catastrophe. Prior to the
first test of an atomic bomb, scientists were not sure whether the test could Ignite
the atmosphere and produce a global holocaust. Calculations by Hans Bethe in-
dicated that the likelihood of atmospheric ignition was extremely small (although
not zero), and the test went ahead. Arthur Compton, a minister's son deeply in-
volved in the administration of the U.S. atom bomb program, wrote in response to
the concern: "Better to accept the slavery of the Nazis than to run a chance of
drawing the final curtain on mankindl" RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE
ATOMIC BOMB 417-419 (1988).
35. See e.g., ICHARDA. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW 11-12 (3d ed. 1986);
Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 100; John A. Haigh,
David Harrison Jr. & Albert L. Nichols, Beneftt-Cost Analysis of Environmental
Regulation: case studies of Hazardous Air Poblutants, 8 HARv. ENVT'L L. REv. 395
(1984).
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also may reflect a view that there is some universal prefer-
ence for a pristine environment. But can we assume the
existence of any universal view of the inherent value of
nature? Can we assume what attitudes will be held by fu-
ture generations on the value of natural vistas or the exis-
tence of other species? More importantly, general state-
ments that future generations will prefer cleaner air and
water to more polluted air and water say nothing about
future preferences regarding the priority to be accorded
clean air and water as against other preferences. Given the
variability of human views toward the environment that
previous generations have held, we cannot conclude that
our views are the ones that "must" be held by the future.
Indeed, we can be sure that the preferences and values of
future generations will be different from our own.
2. The Future Cannot Speak
No future humans are now present to assert whatever
moral claims they might have. Present humans can ex-
press their views of the morality of present actions that af-
fect the future, and some have argued for the creation of
special representatives for the future.' Indeed, the Su-
preme Court of the Philippines has upheld the standing of
children to speak for future generations." Nonetheless,
without access to an understanding of the preferences or
"interests" of the future, no present human can properly
claim to speak for the distant future.
3. We Cannot Quantify the Impact of Our Actions on the
Future
Almost all forms of moral analysis of our relationship to
future generations involve an assessment of the future im-
pact of our present actions. A utilitarian assessment, for
example, that attempts to maximize the welfare of both pre-
sent and future generations will require both the calcula-
36. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 23 at 120-126 (1989); G.S. Kavka and V. War-
ren, Political Representation for Future Generations, in Environmental Philosophy
21 (R. Elliot and A. Gare, eds. 1983).
37. Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Dept of Environment and Natural Re-
sources, 33 I.L.M. 173 (Phil. 1994); See Allen, The Philippine Children's Case: Rec-
ognizing Legal Standing for Future Generations, 60 Geo. Int'l EnvVl. L. Rev. 713
(1994).
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tion of the impact of our actions on future humans and, for
purposes of comparison, the discounting of that future im-
pact to present value. As discussed below, it may not be
possible to meaningfully perform such calculations when
we are considering the impact of our actions on the more
distant future.
38
4. We Cannot Know the Future
In virtually all cases, decisions must be made in the ab-
sence of certainty about the environmental consequences of
our actions. Policy makers, for example, are required to
make decisions about emission levels for environmental
pollutants with imperfect information about the human
health and environmental effects of such exposure. Un-
certainty in this context can arise both from a lack of data
or limited understanding of the biological mechanisms
through which human health or environmental problems
occur.
An additional, and distinct, element of uncertainty is in-
troduced when we consider the impact on future humans.
In considering the probability of impacts on the future, it is
possible that intervening events will occur that affect future
impacts. It is comforting, if naive, to believe that future in-
genuity will allow humans to avoid the adverse health and
environmental consequences of its present decisions, but it
is possible. We may cure cancer; we may develop non-
polluting sources of energy. But then again, maybe we
won't. This possibility of such intervening events creates
an element of uncertainty that is different in kind from the
uncertainty surrounding our assessment of impacts on the
present.3 9
5. Present Actions Shape and Alter Future Preferences
Our present actions will shape not only the options avail-
able but also the preferences that will be held by future
humans. In one sense it is difficult to prefer what you do
not know, and alternative environments that might have
existed but for our current actions, might not even be per-
38. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impli-
cations of this distinctive element of uncertainty.
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ceived as options by future generations.'
Further, people appear to hold a preference for their cur-
rent situation. This has been described as "adaptive pref-
erence."4 ' "Adaptive preference" can lead people in terrible
situations to show a preference for their current situation
regardless of how irrational such a preference may seem.
Additionally, there may simply be something akin to in-
ertia associated with our commitment to the status quo.
The asymmetry of preferences when expressed in terms of
"willingness to pay" or "willingness to accept" seems based,
at least in part, on a somewhat irrational commitment to
the status quo.42 This suggests the possibility that future
generations will be biased to accept the world they inherit.43
III. EVALUATING OUR MORAL RELATIONSHIP IN TERMS OF RIGHT,
DUTY, OR OBLIGATION
For many, the issue of our moral relationship to future
generations should be analyzed in terms of moral "rights"
40. Discussing the problem of identifying the preferences that will be held by
future generations, Christopher Stone has noted:
The burden is heavier, however, because their very tastes are destined to be
affected by the legacy we leave them: whether, for example, they ever have the
opportunity to experience clear skies and equatorial forests. Therefore, even if
we are committed to account for their interests in principle, we cannot simply
rely on our best possible projection of what those interests shall be. The wants
of future persons is not some independent fact beyond our influence, like the
distance to the moon.
STONE, supra note 14 at 87 (1987).
41. See, e.g., Jon Elster. Sour Grapes - Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants,
IN UzIIIrARIANISM AND BEYOND 219 (Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds.,
1982): Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. Legal
Stud. 217, 236-237 (1993). It also can be described as "sweet lemon" (the ana-
logue to 'sour grapes*). In other words, people stuck with an unpleasant situa-
tion may rationalize their predicament by perceiving the situation as. in fact,
pleasant. This may not just be a brave front, but in fact the actual perception of
the situation by the individual.
42. See Daniel A. Farber. Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest,
41 Stan. L.Rev. 1021, 1035 (1989)(citing Ames Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Ra-
tional Choice and the Framing of Decisions. in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRASr
BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67 (R. Hogarth & M. Redar eds. 1987).
43. This observation could be used to justify environmental degradation. In-
deed one could argue that a possible social goal would be to shape the prefer-
ences of the future to accept what we would now judge to be unacceptable condi-
tions. Cf Martin H. Krieger, What's Wrong with Plastic Trees, 179 SCIENCE 446
(1973). Arguments relying on claims of adaptive preference can also have perni-
cious effects that justify the treatment of persons in less preferred conditions in
society. See AMARTYA SEN. INEgUAIIY REEXAMINED (1992).
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held by future generations that result in "obligations" im-
posed on the present generation. Applying the language of
"right," "claim," or "duty," some have posited a variety of
obligations that the present generation has to future gen-
erations." Traditional utilitarian and deontological ethical
theories that have been used to evaluate rights and obliga-
tions among existing humans have, however, distinct limi-
tations when applied to evaluate the relationship between
present and future humans.
A. A Utilitarian Assessment of the Future
Many Western ethical theories focus on the consequences
of actions. In these consequentialist or teleological views,
the morality of an action is judged by the effect or outcome
produced by that action.45 Perhaps the most influential
statement of such a consequentialist view is a form of
utilitarianism most closely associated with Jeremy Ben-
tham. In the utilitarian view, the morality of a system is
judged by its capacity to produce the greatest "good" for the
greatest number of people. One of the fundamental issues
in utilitarianism is the nature of the "good" that is to be
maximized, but for most this "good" consists in the satis-
faction of the non-moral preferences of individuals in soci-
ety.' Utilitarianism thus measures the morality of an ac-
tion by the extent to which it maximizes the satisfaction of
society as a whole. If we are willing to equate this "good"
with maximization of wealth, then an economic cost/benefit
analysis may be viewed as a technical expression of the
moral principle of utilitarianism. 47  Although few people
44. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
45. Although perhaps not "right" based, certain consequentialist or utilitarian
views do suggest an imperative that we must act to maximize the good of people.
In some sense, a utilitarian view is a logical expression of the duty of beneficence -
a moral duty to promote the well-being of others. See infra note 58. In another
view, utilitarianism Is an expression of the duty or value of autonomy since it
measures the morality of an action by the extent to which the individual prefer-
ences of members of are maximized. See infra note 65.
46. See, e.g., FRANKENA. supra note 29 at 34.
47. Through a cost/benefit analysis, the total costs of a proposed action can be
compared with the total benefits where both costs and benefits are expressed in
comparable units - present discounted dollar value. Actions, in cost/benefit
terms, can be Justified only when the overall benefits to society warrant the action
regardless of distributional or other concerns that might warrant the action.
The ethical basis of cost/benefit analysis in U.S. environmental policy is a matter
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would view utilitarianism as a sufficient basis for making
moral evaluations, 8 it is clear that utilitarianism, at least
as expressed through some form of cost/benefit analysis, is
a theme in U.S. environmental policy.
There appear to be no conceptual problems with includ-
ing the welfare of future humans in a utilitarian calculus.
A utilitarian could require that actions maximize the wel-
fare of all humans both existing and future. There are,
however, at least two distinct classes of problems that
make application of utilitarian principles to future humans
problematic.
1. Calculating the Value of Benefits and Burdens in the
Future
One class of problems arises from the problem of assign-
ing values to future costs and benefits. In order to evaluate
the net utility of a policy, we must be able to compare costs
and benefits. This requires that costs and benefits be re-
duced to a common unit, which for cost/benefit purposes is
the present value of a dollar. 9 The costs of pollution con-
trol equipment can be measured through use of their price
in a market economy. The dollar values of non-market
of considerable dispute. See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH:
PHiLOSOPY, IAw, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit
Analysis - An Ethical Critique. REGUILATON. January-February, 1981 at 33. In-
deed, whether cost/benefit analysis is an expression of a utilitarian philosophy is
open to question. See, e.g., Richard . Posner. Utilitarianism Economics and Le-
gal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979).
48. One is forced to wonder about the moral values of politicians who would re-
quire Justification of environmental regulations in cost/benefit terms.
49. Expression of environmental values in dollar terms is a problem that gener-
ally exists in evaluating the effects of a policy on present humans. This problem
is especially acute for non-market goods such as clean air and water or the aes-
thetic or culture value of environmental preservation. See, e.g., James Salzman,
Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 Ecology .L. Q. 887 (1997); Brian R. Binger et al.,
The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource Damage As-
sessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1029 (1995); Frank
B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation. 42 Vand. L. Rev. 269 (1989);
Haigh, Harrison & Nichols, supra note 35.
The problem of valuation exists most acutely when the non-market good is hu-
man life. A strict utilitarian assessment will require a comparison of the value of
a lost human life with the benefits of an action that produced the loss. The need
for this comparison has produced a "rich" literature on the estimation of the dollar
value of human life. See, e.g.. Richard Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valuing Lives,
23 Pub. Poly 419 (1975); Lewis A. Konhauser, The Value of Life, 38 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 209 (1990).
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goods, such as improved air quality, can be assessed
through various methods of contingent valuation.
Both market prices and estimates of non-market value
reflect an estimate of the preferences of existing humans by
comparing how much they value one item. as opposed to
others. The problem of expressing these preferences for
future humans is, however, different in kind. Existing hu-
mans have preferences; future humans do not (or at least
not yet).50
Closely related to the problem of identifying the prefer-
ences of future generations (expressed as a dollar value) is
the problem of estimating the economic cost of the loss of a
resource to future generations. For some, a major aspect of
intergenerational equity involves actions by the present
generation that either deprive future generations of access
to a resource or substantially raise the marginal cost of ac-
cess to a resource.5 ' Yet history suggests that we cannot
predict the marginal utility of resources one hundred years
from now. Little over one hundred years ago petroleum was
not a significant resource. Until recently, salt was a scarce
commodity that represented significant wealth.
2. Comparing Present and Future Costs and Benefits
Another class of problems arises from the comparison
of present costs and benefits to future costs and benefits.
If we attempt to maximize the utility experienced by all fu-
ture humans, we run into the inescapable fact that there
are simply more of them then there are of us. Therefore, if
we compare the benefits of present consumption enjoyed by
the finite class of existing humans with the costs imposed
by that consumption on the potentially infinite class of fu-
ture humans, existing humans lose. Whatever costs, how-
ever small, that would be experienced by all future hu-
50. As discussed above, not only are the preferences of future humans un-
knowable, they are certainly not stable. There is no one single set of preferences
that we are attempting to capture at some point in time in the future. Over the
next hundreds of years, the preferences and satisfactions of humans are certain
to change. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 23 at 6-9. The issue of estimating marginal
utility of resources becomes more manageable as we shorten our time horizon. As
suggested above, when we are dealing with impacts that will occur over the next
generation or two, it may be proper to treat the ethical issues as equivalent to
those that arise within an existing generation.
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mans, will overwhelm whatever benefit, however great, to
present humans. Even if, as discussed below, we are able
to discount the present value of future costs, the dis-
counted value of an infinite cost is still infinite (or at least
really, really big).52 This leads to the conclusion that each
generation should sacrifice its present interests, at least
beyond consumption to ensure minimal survival, to provide
benefits to the future. Since this logic applies equally to
each generation, we are led to a world of perpetual denial
for the sake of a future that never arrives.'
Another problem of comparison arises when we "dis-
count" the value of future costs and benefits. Since the
value of receipt of a dollar today is not the same as the
right to receive a dollar in 100 years, cost/benefit analysis
typically reduces the value of all future costs and benefits
to present value. Methods of discounting which, among
other things, require use of some discount rate or projected
interest rate on current dollars, provide the technical
means for comparing present and future dollars in equal
terms.
Discounting, however, raises very difficult issues. The
general problem of discounting to reflect future environ-
mental harms and benefits has been well described else-
where.' Suffice it to say that discounting some future
benefits (at least those benefits that have some finite dura-
tion so that we avoid the problem of infinite benefit) pro-
duces a "perverse" preference in favor of present consump-
tion. We enter a paradoxical world where we are
discouraged from spending present money to provide a
distant discounted benefit.
Discounting of future benefits is perverse and paradoxical
since, for example, it can lead to a conclusion that one life
52. Notwithstanding Zeno's paradox, it is possible to identify a finite value for a
converging, but infinite, series, but the problem of the comparing the benefits to a
potentially infinite stream of future humans with the benefits to a finite group of
existing humans still remains.
53. This argument, however, assumes pure consumption of resources by the
present, and ignores the critical distinction between consumption and investment
in evaluating our obligations to the future. This distinction is discussed below.
See tnfra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
54. See Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Fb-
ture: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment. 46 Vand. L. Rev.
267 (1993).
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saved today is of greater benefit than billions of lives saved
hundreds of years from now. For example, with a five per-
cent discount rate, one life today would have the same
value as more than 3 billion lives in four hundred fifty
years.' Therefore, cost-benefit analysis would suggest that
those 3 billion lives could be rationally sacrificed if the cost
to the present generation exceeded the value of a single ex-
isting life.
56
This also raises the moral question of whether we should
discount the value of a future life when comparing it to the
value of saving an existing life. The issue of the relation-
ship of the value of a present life to a future life is dis-
cussed below. "
For these, and certainly other reasons, a utilitarian moral
evaluation of our responsibility to the future has problems
that are different in kind from those presented by a utili-
tarian analysis of our obligation to our fellow current hu-
mans.
B. Deontological Values and the Rights of the Future
Independent of any utilitarian calculus, there are some
values that can be claimed regardless of whether recogni-
tion of these values maximizes the good of society as a
whole. This class of "deontological" theories (from the
Greek "deontos" or duty) attempts to identify fundamental
ethical values. A deontological basis has been asserted for
such values as beneficence (an affirmative obligation to
take steps to promote the welfare of others), non-
maleficence (a negative obligation to avoid inflicting harm
on others), the autonomy of individuals, truth telling,
promise keeping and, in some forms of deontological analy-
sis, fairness or justice.
55. See Menell and Stewart, Environmental Law and Policy 138 (1994)(citlng
Richard A. Liroff, Cost-Benefit Analysis in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS, IN
COSr-BENEFTr ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGUlATIONS: PoITIcS, ETHICS AND
MEmODs 35, 44 (Daniel Swartzman et al. eds. 1982) citing a National Research
Council committee report: *Decision Making for Regulating Chemicals in the En-
vlronment.* (Washington, D.C., 1975), pg. 43.)
56. PARFrr, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 24 at 482 (exploring arguments
for discounting one billion deaths in four hundred years).
57. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
270 [24:249
Future Rights and Present Virtue
1. Beneficence: An Obligation to Improve the Future
Do we have a. duty of "beneficence" to future genera-
tions?' The concept of beneficence implies an affirmative
obligation to promote the well-being of others. Although
U.S. environmental policy clearly suppoits regulation of
conduct that would adversely affect others (non-
maleficence), it is more problematic as to whether we rec-
ognize an affirmative duty on society to improve the well-
being of others.
Given our limited understanding of the needs of future
generations, recognition of an affirmative moral claim by
the future that we "improve" their lot seems problematic.
Can we say that we have "improved" the life of future hu-
mans if we reduce the level of material wealth that they in-
herit in order to preserve environmental options? Did
European invaders fail in a duty of beneficence by drasti-
cally altering the North American environment? However
problematic in application, many might acknowledge a
moral duty to ensure that our descendants have a "better
life than we have.
2. Avoiding the Infliction of Harm on the Future
One central value in Western ethical thought has been
the obligation to avoid inflicting harm on others. This has
been described as a duty of "non-maleficence."5 Such a
value is reflected in a persistent issue in environmental
ethics - the morality of inflicting physical harm, or at least
the statistical likelihood of physical harm, on some present
humans for the benefit of other present humans. Although
U.S. environmental policy may be somewhat incoherent in
its implementation of the concept of "non-maleficence," our
policy at least honors both the abstract concepts that
harming others is wrong and that all humans, have equal
58. See, FRANENA, supra note 29 at 45-48 (describing beneficence as the obli-
gation to do good and prevent harm); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP AND JAMES F. CHnDss,
PRINCIPLES OF BIoMEDICAL ETHICS 260 (1994) (describing beneficence as the moral
obligation to act for the benefit of others, and distinguished from non-maleficence
which is the duty to avoid harm to others).
59. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP AND CHUmDRESS, Id. at 189-259. This can be seen as
contrasting with a duty of "beneficence" that implies an affirmative obligation to
promote the good of others. See supra note 58.
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value."
Recognition of a moral duty to avoid harming future hu-
mans raises complex questions. Is an action that might
harm three humans today morally equivalent to an action
that is projected to harm three humans in a hundred
years? Is it morally permissible to prefer an action that will
avoid harming one human today over an action that will
avoid harming three people in the future? In other words,
is all human life of equal value regardless of when it exists?
This statement of the issue may elicit a feeling of unease
in many people. On the one hand, most people would
probably assert that all humans have the same inherent
moral worth; the lives of some unknown future humans are
no less worthy than the lives of unknown present humans.
On the other hand, many people would also feel that the
possibility of inflicting physical harm on present humans is
somehow more morally blameworthy than the possible in-
fliction of harm on persons who may live hundreds of years
in the future.
This apparent conflict can be resolved by the recognition
of an unstated premise - estimates of risk to future humans
are inherently less certain than estimates of risks to pres-
ent humans. As discussed above, estimates of the impact
of our actions on existing humans are frequently uncertain,
but there is an additional, and distinct, element of uncer-
tainty associated with the prediction of the impact of an
action on future humans.
That distinctive uncertainty factor arises from the many
unknowable intervening events that may occur. How can
we compare the risk of cancer to someone today with the
risk to someone hundreds of years from now when so many
potential variables intervene? Cancer may be cured. Pol-
60. Aspiratonal goals of zero pollution and environmental quality standards
that purport to protect against human health and environmental harms, with an
ample margin of safety, reflect some concern that harm to others is wrong. See,
e.g., Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994)(national goal of elimination of
all discharge of pollutants to water); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7409(b)(1)(1994)(prlmary national ambient air quality standards to be set "requi-
site to protect the public health" with an ample margin of safety.) The Environ-
mental Justice movement is one expression of both the aspirations and failures of
environmental policy to treat all humans equally. See, e.g., 12,898, Exec. Order
No. 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations).
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lution may be contained or eliminated with future technol-
ogy. Whether or not such events do in fact occur, there is
some element of uncertainty in evaluating the impacts on
future humans that does not appear in evaluating the im-
pacts on present humans. Such uncertainty could be ex-
pressed as a "futurity discount factor" representing the
possibility of unanticipated intervening events. 61
Application of such a "futurity discount factor" could re-
duce our estimates of future adverse effects. Although it is
not certain, most intervening events that we can reasonably
imagine are likely to mitigate impacts. Such events might
include the development of new technology, the switch to
alternative resources, or the discovery of new medical
treatments. Obviously future panaceas may not occur, but
the possibility of their occurrence does justify some dis-
counting of the probability of future impacts. Use of such a
"futurity discount factor" would alter the "expected value" of
the projected impacts and therefore reduce the present ex-
pected impact on future lives.
Use of such a distinctive "futurity discount factor" helps
resolve several problems associated with discounting the
value of future lives. First, a futurity discount allows us to
treat the value of present and future lives as equal, both in
moral and financial terms. Application of a futurity dis-
count allows us to rationally account for the likelihood that
future deaths will occur from intervening events. Thus, we
can justify some discount on the predicted impact on fu-
ture lives without the moral dissonance that arises if we
view discounting as an expression of the unequal value of
present and future lives.
Recognition of the unique futurity discount factor also
helps resolve certain conceptual problems associated with
performing cost/benefit analysis. As discussed above,
proper comparison between costs and benefits requires
calculation of the present discounted value of future costs
and benefits. 2 This discounting of future dollars has some
conceptual logic. If you discount the value of one hundred
61. Derek Parfit makes a similar argument in developing a moral Justification
for discounting of future impacts in his evaluation of a "social discount rate." See
PARFTr, IN REASONS AND PERSONS supra note 24 at 480-486.
62. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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dollars to be received ten years from now, you are essen-
tially stating that if you take the present discounted value
and invest it at a specified interest rate, you will actually
have one hundred dollars in ten years.63
There is no such conceptual basis for discounting the
value of a life lost in the future. One cannot invest one life
today to produce additional lives in the future.6 Therefore,
discounting the value of future lives as an expression of
their "present value" makes little sense. Application of a
"futurity discount factor," however, allows discounting
based on the uncertainty of future events, and therefore
may be a more logical basis to justify discounting the im-
pacts on future lives.
3. Limiting the Autonomy of Future Humans
Another key value in western ethical thought is the
autonomy of the individual.' The concept of individual
autonomy has a variety of meanings, but in one sense (and
the way in which it will be used here), it expresses the
value of the ability of moral agents to form and express
their own individual moral and non-moral judgments.
Autonomy in this sense is furthered by policies that in-
crease the ability of persons to make informed decisions
and which maximize the opportunity for individuals to re-
alize their chosen values and preferences.
Any choice we make today, however, forecloses some op-
tions (and creates others) in the future. Our present ability
63. See Farber and Hemmersbaugh, supra note 54 at 277.
64. Perhaps you can. Hillel N. Jacobson, the student editor of this essay, sug-
gests an argument that would "technically" justify discounting of future lives. As
he notes, "Since one person today can expect to have a certain number of descen-
dents, a life today can be expected to produce five lives in a hundred years thus
allowing one to discount lives to present value."
65. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS, supra note 58 at 120-131. Much of
the analysis of ethical systems and judgments can be explained in terms of this
core value. In one sense, for example, utilitarianism can be' seen as based on the
value of individual autonomy if its goal Is the maximization, not of some abstract
concept of good or pleasure, but the individual and unique expressions of prefer-
ences by individuals. (Some forms of utilitarianism would then sacrifice individual
autonomy for the greater good of the greatest number.) More specifically, forms of
environmental policies that require dissemination of information to the public can
be seen as furthering the value of individual autonomy of persons who now have
better information on which to base their individual Judgments and preferences.
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to express our preference for a deciduous forest ecology for
North America has been substantially limited by the ac-
tions of our ancestors. Our ability to express our prefer-
ences and the range of options we now have to express our
choice with regard to scientific and medical matters has,
presumably, been expanded by the actions of our ances-
tors.
The impact of our present actions on the autonomy of
future generations is one of the crucial elements, perhaps
the crucial element, of a moral analysis of actions affecting
future generations.' A focus on autonomy makes the issue
of the preferences of future generations particularly impor-
tant, since an evaluation of the extent to which our present
actions foreclose, or expand, meaningful options available
to the future depends on an understanding of the options
that are significant to them.
4. Distributional Justice and the Future
Different forms or levels of environmental control will
produce varying distributions of benefits and harms within
existing members of society. To what extent should some
be forced to bear potential health impairment as a conse-
quence of the pursuit of profit by others? How much
should some person's conception of an aesthetic value of
the environment be limited to promote another's view?
These concerns raise fundamental ethical issues when
phrased in terms of the distribution of benefits and harms
to present humans.
The problem of distributional fairness has unique ele-
ments when the issue focuses on the distribution of bene-
66. Many commentators have noted the significance of a loss of "choice" for fu-
ture generations. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 23 at 40; Brian Barry. Circum-
stances of Justice and Future Generations, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUuRE GENERATIONS.
supra note 14 at 204. Indeed, Barry claims that demands of justice in the
intergenerational context is largely concerned with issues of choice. He writes:
In the case of justice between generations, equality of opportunity has to be
taken in sufficiently broad terms. What justice requires, I suggest, is that the
overall range of opportunities open to successor generations should not be nar-
rowed. If some openings are closed off by depletion or other irreversible damage
to the environment, others should be created (if necessary at the cost of some sac-
rifice) to make up.
Id. at 243.
Barry, of-course, seems to be focusing more on the quantity than the quality of
choices available to the future.
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fits and harms between present and future generations.
Some present actions truly consume resources for our cur-
rent benefit. Such actions raise purely distributional ques-
tions of our right to receive present benefits at the expense
of the future. Other actions, however, can be seen as in-
vestments in which one capital resource is converted into
another such that the overall "wealth" of society, both pres-
ent and future, is increased. To return to our example of
the European invaders and the North American environ-
ment, the exploitation of resources has produced enormous
wealth on this continent. All current Americans are re-
ceiving some benefits from the past investments made by
our ancestors. In the case of "investments," issues of dis-
tributional fairness are far more complex than when evalu-
ating the fairness of pure consumption at the expense of
the future.
Assuming that the investment of resources by the present
generation creates the potential for future wealth, then
perhaps the issue is not the fairness of the allocation of re-
sources. Is it, for example, "unjust" for my parents to sell a
family heirloom and invest in stocks that appreciate in
value? There may be other bases for criticizing the morality
of such an action, but these issues may not be captured by
a focus on "distributional justice." The real issue, once
again, may be one of autonomy. Present decisions to rein-
vest or reallocate existing resources limit the options and
alternatives available to the future.
John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, has explored the ethi-
cal obligations implicit in this consumption/investment
distinction." In his view, "[ejach generation must not only
preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain
intact those just institutions that have been established,
but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable
amount of real capital accumulation."6 The extent to which
an existing generation should forego consumption in favor
of the future is determined by identifying a "just savings
rate."'
67. See JoHN RAwLS, supra note 1 at 284-293 (Chapter entitled The Problem of
Justice Between Generations).
68. Id. at 285.
69. Id.
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Rawls' analysis of a Just savings rate is an extension of
his general approach to identifying just social institutions.
Just institutions are developed pursuant to a hypothetical
contractual agreement, or bargaining game, among affected
parties. 70 Just institutions are those that would be mutu-
ally agreeable to all parties participating in this hypotheti-
cal bargaining session. Several predicates must be satis-
fied to ensure the justice of any proposed institutions. The
parties must operate under a "veil of ignorance" as to their
status in society. No person would know their relative
wealth or personal abilities in the society they are design-
ing.71 Another critical predicate, that Rawls calls the "dif-
ference principle," is that institutions must be designed in
such a manner that the expectations of the least advan-
taged members of society are maximized.
Rawls recognizes several distinct applications of this gen-
eral approach as it applies to his theory of "justice between
generations." He recognizes, for example, that the "Veil of
ignorance" in this context means that the hypothetical per-
sons who will define the just institutions are not only igno-
rant of their particular status in society but also ignorant of
their position in time. They' do not know to which genera-
tion they will belong. Additionally, Rawls recognizes that
any "just savings rate" will vary depending on the relative
wealth of the society. Earlier (and presumably poorer so-
cieties) are entitled to a greater level of consumption. Later,
wealthier societies must ensure greater savings for the fu-
ture. Ultimately, however, once some undefined minimum
level of wealth and culture is achieved, justice is ensured
by practices that provide subsequent generations the same
70. Professor Ackerman has also explored the obligations between generations
and describes his own form of "bargaining game" to determine an equitable
transfer of gain to future generations. Professor Ackerman's analysis, however.
seems to focus on the implications for Inequality wihin a generation that arises
from an unfair allocation of inherited wealth. He does, however, suggest that un-
der a "trusteeship" model, the present generation may be limited in its ability to
consume, at the expense of future generations, the capital that It received.
ACKERMAN, supra note 33 at 201-227.
71. The "veil of ignorance" regarding their unique status in society ensures that
the hypothetical participants in the bargaining game wil not shape social institu-
tions to satisfy their special situation: it is intended to eliminate bias and self-
interest The veil of ignorance does not, however, apply to generalized knowledge
of the world and "whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of Jus-
tice." RAWiS, supra note 1 at 136-37.
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level of "civilization" without a savings rate that ensures
"growth" of the society. One reading of Rawls' view, there-
fore, is that distributional fairness across generations is to
be measured, not by a focus on individual resources, but
generally on the preservation of broad institutions and the
increase in capital to be transferred to successive genera-
tions.
Rawls is hardly blind to the inherent difficulties and
limitations of defining "just" obligations between genera-
tions, and, in fact, his analysis has deep difficulties as a
meaningful guide to identifying environmental obligations
between generations. First, by reducing the analysis to de-
velopment of a "just savings rate," Rawls appears to be de-
fining ethical obligations in terms of wealth or utility. Al-
though his difference principle avoids some criticisms that
could be applied to a strict utilitarian analysis, Rawls' ap-
proach still seems to ignore other profound values that
could be relevant. His analysis, for example, fails to guide
us in determining what decisions can be made that limit
the ultimate autonomy of future generations to choose be-
tween wealth and other environmental values.
Also, his rather terse reference to the fact that the term
"savings" applies to general "conditions of civilization" be-
yond simple wealth is no guide in determining what it
means to apply a savings rate to culture. 2 Must we ensure
that elements of country music are preserved for the fu-
ture? 3 Must the perceived cultural advantages of "foot
binding" or "female circumcision" be passed as part of an
obligation to ensure a "just savings rate" of culture? If,
however, any given generation is authorized to reject past
cultural and social decisions based on its current moral
views, then the concept of an intergenerational bargaining
game is called into question since each generation may be
free to substitute its judgment for that of the initial hypo-
thetical negotiators. Indeed, a "just savings rate" as applied
to cultural and environmental issues may be meaningless.
Further, his approach assumes that all generations are
72. Ackerman is sensitive, if not wholly satisfying, in addressing the problem of
evaluating and expressing future preferences for "irreplaceable resources." Id. at
212-216.
73. There is probably universal agreement on the need to preserve Hank Wl-
liams for future generations. Beyond that, moral intuition falls.
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"at the table" in developing just institutions, and each gen-
eration is operating under a "veil of ignorance" about their
own future conditions. Yet, if anything is clear in the
analysis of the ethical relationship among generations, it is
that we do not have access to the varying preferences and
values that will be and have been expressed throughout
time. Rawls' predicate of a "veil of ignorance" has a special
and unintended implication in his analysis of justice be-
tween generations. We, who are actually engaged in the
development of justice institutions through this hypotheti-
cal dialogue among affected parties, are in fact operating in
ignorance of the preferences of the peoples whose contract
we are presumably negotiating.
C. The Futility of Analyzing the Moral Relationship in
Terms of Rights and Obligations
Expressions of our moral relationship to the future in
terms of rights and obligations have a strong appeal. Iden-
tification of the "rights" of future generations expresses the
moral equivalence between present and future humans and
may serve to place limits on the actions of the present. For
several reasons, however, expression of the moral relation-
ship in "rights" terms may be seen as futile.
First, there is no consensus on the class of rights held by
the future. As discussed below, a variety of rights have
been proposed.'4
Second, phrasing the moral relationship in terms of
"right" or "obligation" may not help in resolving the most
difficult element issue - resolving disputes when there are
conflicting "rights" held by present and future generations.
Although recognition of a "right" would, for some, raise the
priority of a claim based on that right, most recognize that
rights are not absolutes. It can be morally appropriate to
limit some rights, at least when they conflict with other
rights. Dworkln, who in Taking Rights Seriously champions
the granting of a priority to rights in disputes among pres-
ent humans, seems to be saying that identification of a
"right" may simply limit the use of utilitarian arguments as
a basis for limiting that right.m Once we enter the realm of
74. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
75. See DwoRKIN. supra note 15 at 191-192. As discussed above, however, a
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conflicts among rights, we are left with profound uncer-
tainties as to the manner of their reconciliation.
Third, even if we recognize a moral obligation to the fu-
ture stemming from principles of beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy and fairness, it may not be possible
to frame rights or duties that arise from these principles in
any manner that can meaningfully guide our present ac-
tions. Numerous intergenerational rights and obligations
have been proposed, but most have serious limitations as
useful tools for deciding moral controversies.
Some, such as Ackerman, conclude that each generation
has the obligation to pass on at least as much capital as it
received.76 Others, such as Rawls, conclude that there is
an obligation not only to preserve and pass on to future
generations a quality of civilization at least equal to what
this generation received but also to apply a "Just savings
principle" such that future generations receive more than
previous generations." Many have suggested that the pres-
ent generation can be viewed as being a "trustee" for future
generations. This has led to suggestions to apply legal
rules associated with trust law to evaluate the obligations
that apply to the present generation. Professor Edith
Brown Weiss, relying on a principle of "intergenerational
equity," has posited a variety of obligations that the present
owes to the future which, among other things, would im-
pose a duty on the present to conserve resources and avoid
utilitarian analysis of our relationship with future generations may be technically
and conceptually flawed, and the role of utilitarian arguments in this context Is
problematic. That said, a rights-based approach could be seen as limiting our
ability to assert our welfare as a Justification for limiting some defined class of
future rights.
76. Stemming from a basis of moral neutrality among generations, Ackerman
concludes that a position of "undominated equality" must be ensured among suc-
cessive generations. This requires, at a minimum, that the each generation have
access to at least as much capital as that received by prior generations. See
ACKERMAN, supra note 33 at 201-202. His version of a bargaining game focuses on
methods for an equitable distribution of accumulations beyond that minimum.
Id. at 204-207.
77. See RAwLs supra note 1. Rawls would limit this obligation to ensure greater
wealth in future generations once some acceptable level of wealth has been
achieved. At that point, he would require only maintenance of that level.
78. Professor Edith Brown Weiss. for example, has proposed the concept of a
"Planetary Trust." In her view, contemporary legal rules associated with "charita-
ble trusts" could serve to guide our decisions. Edith Brown Weiss, The Panetary
Trust: Conservation and Intergeneratlonal Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 495 (1984).
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adverse impacts.7 9
These proposed obligations, however, seem to have little
power to guide our current search for answers to moral
disputes.' Virtually all of these proposed rights and duties
focus on some obligation to pass on the quality of the
planet and its resources in as "good" a condition as we re-
ceived it or to ensure "equitable distribution" of resources,
or to maintain a "sustainable" environment. As noted
above, however, it is difficult to determine which are the
critical components of the environment that must be
"passed on" to the future. Did early inhabitants of the
British Isles have a duty to conserve access to peat bogs?
Can we truly project the value that resources, including
aesthetic resources, will hold for the future so that we can
ensure that they receive their "fair share" of these re-
sources?
If such obligations ignore the quality of life and become
merely an obligation to ensure a world in which humans
are capable of existing, then surely the obligation has been
reduced to triviality. A moral limitation that prevents us
from obliterating the possibility of any future human exis-
tence has little force in evaluating the real questions that
confront us."'
Rights that stem from institutions designed to address
79. Edith Brown Weiss, in In Fairness to Future Generations, identifies five
"Planetary Obligations" that stem from her principle of Intergenerational Equity.
These include duties to 1) conserve resources in order to maintain sufficient di-
versity to preserve options for the future, 2) ensure equitable access to resources
by all generations, 3) avoid adverse impacts from our present actions so that we
pass on the planet in as good a condition as we received it, 4) prevent disasters,
minimize damage, and provide emergency assistance, and 5) compensate for envi-
ronmental harm. Weiss, supra note 23 at 47-86.
Professor Weiss, in In Fairness to Future Generations, also includes the text of
"GOA Guidelines on Intergenerational Equity" developed by the "Advisory Com-
mittee" to the "United Nations University Project on International Law, Common
Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity." Id., Appendix A. These Guidelines re-
cite principles of intergenerational equity that mirror concerns for conservation of
resources and the obligation to "pass on" our natural and cultural heritage.
80. Professor Epstein. in an essay on Rawls' approach to Justice between gen-
erations, states that "the debate on equity between the generations focuses too
much on duty and too little on practice and incentive." Epstein, supra note 26 at
1466. Perhaps not surprisingly, Professor Epstein concludes that, the present
generation's concern for its descendants, reliance on free market mechanisms will
best ensure equity to the future.
8 1. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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relations among existing humans, such as trust law, also
pose significant conceptual difficulties.82
The difficulty with these "obligations" lies not in their
moral stature. Our concern for the well-being of future
generations may lead us to consider similar factors in as-
sessing the morality of our actions. s The problem lies in
phrasing these factors as "obligations" stemming from the
"rights" of a distant future. This language requires us to
view the situation from the perspective (and the prefer-
ences) of future generations. This cannot easily be done.
Ultimately, the focus on future rights may be unneces-
sary since we need not rely on principles based on rights or
obligations in order to express properly our concern for
future generations. It is possible to identify a group as
"worthy" of our moral consideration without ascribing
rights to that group." A group, in other words, can be a
"moral subject" without being a "moral agent." Some, for
82. It is attractive to think of the relationship of the present generation to the
future as analogous to the relationship between a trustee and beneficiary. How-
ever, there are critical distinctions in the relationship between trustee and benefi-
ciary, especially in the context of charitable trusts, and the relationship between
present and future generations. First, trusts are created by grantors who specify
the objectives of the trust. Outside of possible theological arguments, it is difficult
to resort to the grantor's intent in resolving conflicts between present and future
generations. Further, to the extent that the goal of the trustee is to satisfy the in-
terests of the beneficiary, we are faced, as noted above, with the fact that the pref-
erences and values of the infinite class of future beneficiaries is not be within the
understanding of the trustees. Additionally, trust rules that limit self-dealing by
the trustee presuppose the very issues with which we are grappling - the moral
relationship between the present and future. It is not clear what trust rules can
tell us about the extent to which the present generation, the trustee if you will.
must sacrifice its present interests to satisfy the interests of future generations,
the beneficiaries.
Finally, the charitable trust as described by Professor Edith Brown Weiss in The
Planetary TrLst, supra note 78, may have more in common with a legal life estate.
Under traditional rules for life estates, the present interest holder has full right of
use of property, but must, with certain exceptions, pass on the property to future
interest holders in largely the same state in which it was received. A trust model,
however, recognizes that the identity of the assets in the trust can be altered by
the trustee in the exercise of his or her best judgment. Thus, a trust model says
little about the limits on the present generation's ability to alter the environment,
if such alteration constitutes an economically beneficial investment to be realized
by future generations. In other words, the trust model may not be suitable for
evaluating the issue of "autonomy" as it relates to future generations.
83. As discussed below, these concerns are better viewed as expressions of the
moral virtue of "benevolence.* See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
84. There is also a debate, not to be raised here, as to whether the concept of
rights inherently involves reciprocal duties or obligations.
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example, are unwilling to ascribe moral rights to non-
human animals, and yet those same people would ac-
knowledge some moral responsibility to consider the effect
of human actions on those animals. As discussed below,
there may be alternative ethical approaches that may cap-
ture our concern for the future in more satisfactory ways.
IV. OUR MORAL RELATIONSHIP AS VIRTUE
Rather than focus on the obligations we have to the fu-
ture, perhaps we should focus on our obligations to our-
selves. Another class of moral analysis might be helpful in
this regard. The form of moral analysis known as "virtue
ethics" evaluates the morality of an action as judged in re-
lation to the moral virtue of the actor.' For example, truth-
telling can be seen as moral because the act of telling the
truth reflects the virtue of the truth-teller independent of
the effect of truth-telling on other individuals or society.
The focus of virtue ethics actually seems two-fold. First, it
focuses on the cultivation of virtue as an end that is valu-
able in itself. Second, it seems to ensure the adoption of
morally acceptable decisions by focusing on the moral
qualities of the decision-makers.T M
Virtue ethics has a long tradition in Western ethical
thought. It is, historically, most closely associated with
Aristotle in his Nicomachian Ethics."' There are several im-
portant elements of this view of virtue ethics. First, as
noted, moral evaluation focuses not on the act and its con-
sequences, but rather on the actor and his or her under-
85. See FRANKENA, supra note 29 at 63; BEAUCHAMP AND CHIREss, supra note
58 at 62.
86. For example, Beauchamp notes that *[miajor writers in the virtue tradition
have long held that, to cite an observation of Hume's, 'If a man have a lively sense
of honour and virtue, with moderate passions, his conduct will always be con-
formable to the rules of morality; or if he depart from them, his return will be easy
and expeditious." Tom L Beauchamp, Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms
in Bioethics, 69 Ind. LJ. 955 (1994)(quoting David Hume, The Skeptic, in Essays
176 (Eugene Miller ed. 1987)).
87. NICOMACHEAN Enucs, in THE BASIc WoRKs OF AIsrOLE (Richard McKeon ed.
1941). See AIASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981);
W.F.R. HARDiE, Awsronz's En{CAL THEORY (1968). Virtue ethics has roots in
writings of Socrates and Plato as well and was developed and integrated into a
Christian ethical framework by Aquinas. See Greg Pence, Virtue Theory, in A
COMPANION TO ETIcs (Peter Singer, ed. 1993).
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standing and motives. Second, virtue ethics involves very
little emphasis on rules. The determination of virtue re-
sides in an evaluation by the actor of a virtuous "mean"
between intemperate extremes. This, of course, leads to a
central aspect of virtue ethics. As stated by Aristotle, "vir-
tue.., is a state of character involving choice.... ' The
expression of virtue is the deliberative act of determining
the proper course of action. In this view, an important
element of virtue is development of the faculty of "practical
wisdom" - the capacity, distinct from cleverness or pure ex-
ercise of logic, to evaluate and determine proper conduct."
Although utilitarian and rights based approaches have
dominated Western ethical thought for several hundred
years, virtue theory has in the last few decades received re-
newed attention in both philosophical and legal scholar-
ship.90 Virtue theory has its own problems when evaluating
the moral relationships among existing humans,9 1 but,
whatever its limitations, it has particular appeal when
dealing with the relationship between the present and the
future. Virtue theory avoids the need to resolve the "rights"
status of distant generations and allows us to evaluate the
morality of actions that affect the future by reference to our
preferences and values.
88. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 87 at Book 11.6. 1107a.
89. The term used by Aristotle was phronesls. This concept is critical to the ap-
plication of virtue theory since it involves the capacity to deliberate on, and arrive
at proper conclusions regarding the means and ends of a virtuous life. See
HARDIE, supra note 87 at 236. As one writer has stated: "The product of phronesis
is action, not understanding. The phronlmos is one who simply does the right
thing in the given circumstances." Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108
Harv .L.Rev. 1423, 1455 (1995).
90. See, e.g., G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 Philosophy 1
(1958); MAcImTYRE, supra note 87: PHILUPA FoOT, VIUES AND VICES (1978); Don-
ald F. Brosnan, Virtue Ethics in a Perfectionist Theory of Law and Justice. 11 Car-
dozo L.Rev. 335 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, Symposium on Classical Philosophy
and the American Constitutional Order. Virtues and Voices, 66 Chi-Kent L.Rev. 111
(1990).
91. Virtue theory raises fundamental questions such as "why seek to lead a
virtuous life" and what are virtues." It has been criticized for failing to result in
practical guidance, beyond an appeal to the character of the actor, on how to re-
solve ethical dilemmas. From a modem perspective, perhaps the most troubling
issues involve the relationship between virtue theory and rights. Virtuous people
make decisions that can be regarded as morally incorrect and a violation of rights-
based claims. See, e.g., David Solomon, Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics in
Ethical Theory- CHARACTER AND VnRTUE, 428 (Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehhlng,
Jr., Howard K. Wettstein. Eds. 1988); Pence, supra note 87.
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A "virtue theory" approach to future generations would
not find expression in a list of future rights but might con-
tain the following elements:
A. An Evaluation of Our Actions that Affect the Future Is
Grounded in a Virtue of Benevolence
Our concern for the future expresses a view of the univer-
sal value of human life regardless of when it exists. This
view can be seen as a reflection of the virtue of benevolence
which expresses the rightness of promoting the well-being
and quality of life of humanity;' the cultivation and expres-
sion of this virtue therefore lies at the core of our moral re-
lationship to the future.
One criticism of virtue theory has been that it is self-
centered and focuses only on improvement of the virtue
and understanding of the actor. But virtue theory clearly
contemplates that a proper understanding of virtue in-
cludes consideration by the individual of the welfare of oth-
ers. As Aristotle noted, "The [good man] is related to his
friend as to himself (for his friend is another self)."' Thus,
concern for future generations can easily be incorporated
into the conception of benevolence by present humans.
Grounding our moral relationship in terms of benevolence
also avoids the need to resolve the contentious issues of the
rights status of distant generations. One can recognize the
virtue of promoting the well being of others without as-
cribing rights or duties with respect to those others.
92. The virtue of benevolence has been described by one scholar as "a genus or
family of virtues which kindness, generosity, humaneness and compassion are
(overlapping) species or forms. All of these virtues, at least in their primary
manifestations, involve a direct concern for the happiness and well-being of others
- or, as I shall say, for the good of others." JAMES D. WAUACE. VIRTUES AND VICES
128 (1978).
93. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 87 at Book IX. 4. 1166a. Indeed, Aristotle
clearly placed virtue within the context of politics and viewed the virtuous indi-
vidual as expressing concern for the political community. See, e.g., NICOMACHEAN
Enucs, Id. at 1.2.1094b. As one writer frames it, "Eudaimonta [essentially the
conception of a well-lived llfe] requires an extended concern for friends and others
in the political community because only that sort of concern will lead to a full de-
velopment of one's capacities and potential as a human being. Political life is
genuinely constitutive of the person." Huigens. supra note 89 at 1445.
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B. Our Actions Must Be Evaluated in Terms of Our Vision
of the Proper Life for the Future
Perhaps the most significant consequence of a focus on
virtue theory arises from the recognition that the morality
of actions that affect the future must be evaluated based on
our current moral values and preferences. What we must
strive to achieve are decisions which reflect our best and
deepest moral concerns for benevolence to all humanity.
Therefore, when we make decisions that affect the future,
our evaluation must involve our view of the quality of life
we wish to see lived in the future.
This may, in fact, be a more powerful and useful guide to
action than an identification of general normative rules
based on utilitarian or deontological theories. Contempo-
rary disputes over the morality of our actions would ex-
pressly be couched in terms of competing visions for life in
the future. The debate itself becomes the expression of
moral virtue - virtue as choice. Different people may ex-
press their "practical wisdom" in ways that reach differing
conclusions about proper conduct. But the debate itself, if
phrased as a debate over our view of the well-being for the
future, becomes a challenge to exercise and understand the
virtue of benevolence.
C. There May Be No Limit, Other Than Our Virtue, on the
Choices We Make that Affect the Future
Rights-based ethics stand as an imperfect barrier to in-
terference with the interests of the rights holders. Rights
language in connection with future generations produces,
as discussed above, a litany of "shalls" and "shall nots" that
place limits on present action.
Carried to its furthest expression, virtue ethics, devoid of
a complementary rights component, removes all absolute
barriers to our choices." No demands or moral obligations
94. Pence states that virtue theorists such as Maclntyre can be read as seeking
to abandon rights-based theories in favor of virtue ethics. He is critical of this
"eliminatism." Pence, supra note 87 at 253-255. Acceptance of the significance of
virtue theory does not inherently require rejection of rights-based theories; it is
possible to view the different approaches as complementary. Beauchamp, for ex-
ample, has stated:
The arguments in defense of virtue ethics are entirely compelling, but giving the
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constrain our choice; rights no longer trump our choices.
We are free to make "investment" decisions that alter the
environment even as they provide other forms of wealth to
our descendants. We are free to consume existing re-
sources. The autonomy and base of wealth of future gen-
erations may ultimately be limited, but they have no reason
to fault us.
What constrains us are the moral values of the present,
and our vision of the life we choose for the future. Inevita-
bly this means that our current moral and aesthetic prefer-
ences are the only relevant factors in the debate. Different
societies, at different times will no doubt have different vi-
sions of the future, and this will produce different expres-
sions of benevolence. The moral obligation is to ensure
that the actions of present humans properly represent an
expression of our best moral character. There can be no
correct answer to the extent to which we must sacrifice for
the future; there can only be the correct answer of how our
current vision of benevolence to all humanity compels us to
sacrifice.
D. Virtue Theory Leaves a Legacy of Virtue.
Reliance on an appeal to benevolence to promote the in-
terests of the future leaves a legacy that is greater than-the
protection of the environment. By acknowledging and jus-
tifying our actions in terms of virtue, the present generation
also leaves a tradition and culture of virtue to our descen-
dents. This may, ultimately, be the greatest contribution to
the unknown stream of humans who will follow us.
V. CONCLUSION: SEARCHING FOR THE METAPHOR
Although most people recognize that it is ethically appro-
priate to consider the impact of our actions on future gen-
erations, there is little consensus on the moral basis for our
relationship with the future or the proper actions that are
virtues a central place in the moral life does not indicate that a virtue-based
paradigm should displace or take priority over a principle-based paradigm. The
two approaches have different emphases, but they can be mutually reinforcing if
one believes that ethical theory is richer and more complete if the virtues are
included.
Beauchamp, supra note 86 at 968.
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compelled by this concern. Part of the problem may stem
from the fact that there is also no consensus on a metaphor
that helps us to understand or visualize this relationship.
Some have suggested that the present/future relationship
is analogous to the parent/child relationship. 9 But the
immediacy and closeness of the parent/child relationship
makes it an inappropriate metaphor for our concern for
distant generations. Others have suggested a "trustee"
model for this relationship, in which the present generation
acts as a trustee of the earth and future generations are the
beneficiaries of this trust. Although appealing as a meta-
phor, the trustee model may not capture the complexity of
the moral relationship.'
A focus on present virtue provides a somewhat different
metaphor. The image is not of the future speaking to us of
their needs, nor of us seeking to identify and satisfy their
needs. Rather, the metaphor is of the good person strug-
gling to express his or her vision as a benevolent concern
for others. It is a strange, and non-legal, image that at its
core relies on a vision of love. Ultimately, it means that the
relationship between the present and the future does not
derive by what the future demands of us based on their
needs, but what we say to the future about our aspirations.
95. See, e.g., M.P. Golding, ObUgations to Future Generations. in
RESPONSIBJmES TO FtnmE GENERAmONS. supra note 9 at 63.
96. See supra note 82.
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